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T
he era of ambitious economic reforms
in Latin America is over. Gone are the
days of boldly slashing import tariffs,
lifting interest rate controls, or opening
large infrastructure sectors to private
participation in order to boost competi-
tion and efficiency. True, most blatantly inefficient
economic policies have been corrected in many
Latin American countries. But this is not the only
reason that the era of ambitious economic reforms
is over. Much more could be done to introduce effi-
ciency into infrastructure services, to improve the
functioning of public administration, or to make
labor markets both more flexible and equitable. The
main reason for the hiatus is reform fatigue, both
among public opinion at large and among all the
major players in the difficult game of economic
reform. Not only has public opinion become
opposed to further promarket reforms, but fatigue
is also affecting the views of policymakers, the opin-
ions of international organizations, and the prescrip-
tions of top international economic advisers. None
of these groups of players are any longer unified
around the idea that promoting a key set of reforms
to even the playing field for investors and liberalize
markets is essential to accelerate growth.
This paper aims to document and explain these
signs of fatigue in order to explore the future of
reform. The first section following this introduction
uses a variety of statistical indicators, from opinion
surveys to reform indexes, as well as more casuistic
evidence to measure and describe the symptoms
of fatigue in public opinion, policymakers, opinion
leaders, and international organizations and advis-
ers. The second section attempts to uncover the
economic, social, political, and psychological rea-
sons for the fatigue. A discussion of the reforms’
economic and social effects draws from a review of
existing literature, but new empirical research using
opinion surveys data is also presented to analyze the
mismatch between the actual and perceived conse-
quences of the reforms. The third section discusses
the implications of fatigue for the sustainability of
reform. While political reasons are not a major rea-
son behind the fatigue, they will probably be the key
determinant of the future of reform because pursu-
ing promarket reform has proved to be politically
costly and will probably remain so.
Symptoms of Reform Fatigue
T
he sustainability of reform will hinge on the
beliefs and attitudes of the main players: voters,
policymakers, opinion leaders, and the international
community. The purpose of this section is to gauge
the symptoms of reform fatigue among the public
at large and some of the key players of the reform
process. Reform fatigue is defined as the lack of
public support, the loss of confidence in the bene-
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Latinobarómetro annual surveys, which have cov-
ered seventeen Latin American countries since
1996.2 These surveys also provide information on
the attitude toward international trade and foreign
direct investment and toward price controls and
state intervention in productive activities. Table 1
shows the average values for the six aspects of mar-
ket reform considered by the surveys. It indicates
that more than 50 percent of Latin Americans tend
to agree with the basic tenets of promarket reforms
(the exception being privatization). However, the
table clearly shows that the support for promarket
policies has been decreasing since 1998.3
Public opinion. Promarket reforms stand
accused of being one of the causes of the economic
crisis that Latin America is suffering. The attitude
of Latin Americans toward promarket reforms has
become increasingly critical. In 1998 more than 50
percent of Latin Americans thought that privatiza-
tion was beneficial for their country. This percent-
age dropped to 31 percent in 2001 and to 25 percent
in 2003. At the same time, in 1998, 77 percent of
Latin Americans thought that a market economy
was good for the country. In 2003, the percentage
of people who support a market economy dropped
to 18 percent.1 These results come from the
1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003
In favor of economic integration 74 87 88 84
In favor of foreign direct investment 77
In favor of privatization 52 38 31 25
In favor of the market economy 77 67 18
In favor of price freedom 63 57 59
In favor of leaving productive 
activities to the private sector 56 50
Source: Panizza and Yáñez (2003)
TABLE 1



































Public Opinion Support in Latin America for Privatization






































Public Opinion Support in Latin America for Market Economy, 2000–03
Source: Panizza and Yáñez (2003)
1. This drop may be partly due to the fact that there was a slight change in the question. For the years 1998 and 2000 the ques-
tion was “Do you think that market economy is good for the country?” For the year 2003 the question was “Are you satisfied
with the functioning of the market economy?”
2. The surveys comprise an average of 1,200 respondents per country-year. Although the Latinobarómetro data offer an
unprecedented wealth of information, the survey has some problems—namely, that it focuses exclusively on urban popula-
tion and especially that the early rounds of the survey tended to overrepresent individuals with relatively high levels of edu-
cation (Gaviria, Panizza, and Seddon 2000).
3. Panizza and Yáñez (2003) show that the correlation between these variables, while positive and statistically significant, is also
rather low, indicating that the different questions do capture different angles of the attitude toward promarket reforms. 
Figures 1 and 2 show that there are large cross-
country differences in the support for reform.
Figure 1 shows that support for privatization
ranges between 37 percent (in Brazil) to just above
10 percent (in Argentina and Panama). Argentina,
Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Paraguay are the countries where the support for
privatization dropped by the largest amount.
Figure 2 shows a similar trend in the decline of sup-
port for a market economy.
Policymakers. Policymakers are of course key
players in the reform process. To gauge whether
their inclination to pursue promarket reforms is fal-
tering, we first assess evidence from policy
announcements during preelectoral periods by
those elected and then discuss the record of actual
policy decisions while the officials were in office.
In recent years, political leaders in Latin America
have increasingly tended to blame free-market poli-
cies for low economic growth and high unemploy-
ment. During recent political campaigns in
Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador, candidates critical
of “neoliberal” economic policies performed well. In
Argentina, Nestor Kirchner won the presidency in
April 2003 campaigning against the neoliberal
model and what he called “lamentable and disas-
trous” policies imposed by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF); instead, he favored a greater
role for the state in the economy. In Bolivia, Evo
Morales, who came within a percentage point of
winning the election in June 2002, described his
electoral campaign as representing “the victims of
neoliberalism.” In Ecuador, Lucio Gutiérrez, who
was compared to Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez because4 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
model appear to be one of degrees (economic policy
in Argentina remains geared toward recovering from
the disastrous default and devaluation in 2001–02).
Hugo Chávez’s populist policies have not spread else-
where, and Lucio Gutiérrez continues to work with
the IMF. Looking ahead, a more sincere antireform
candidate could be elected in the near future. Frente
Amplio leader Tabaré Vazquez will be a strong presi-
dential candidate in Uruguay in 2005, while Alan
García has undergone a political rebirth in Peru.
Nevertheless, for now the gap between rhetoric and
policy persists.
Can we offer more rigorous support to the claims
that, while there is no regionwide retrenchment of
promarket policies, recent governments are no
more inclined than their predecessors in the early
nineties to maintain or advance market-friendly
reforms? To answer this question we can draw from
the main conclusions by Lora and Panizza (2002b),
who use a set of indicators that attempt to measure
the extent of promarket reform in the areas of
trade, financial, tax, privatization, and labor market
policies. A composite index covering all these areas,
calculated for seventeen Latin American countries,
rose from 0.34 in 1984 to 0.58 by the late 1990s (on
a scale from 0 to 1). This increase is significant in
and of itself, yet it also suggests that many coun-
tries have a very broad margin of unexploited
potential for the introduction of additional reforms,
especially in the areas of privatization and tax poli-
cies, where the process of reform has been very
uneven across countries, and in labor regulations
and institutions, the least active area of reform.
Reforms expanded the most between 1989 and
1994, when an improvement of 0.12 points was reg-
istered out of a total increase of 0.24 for the entire
period. In the second half of the nineties the gain was
only 0.04 points, implying that the process has lost
momentum (see Figure 3). Since this system of
indexes is available up to 1999 only, we have com-
plemented them with information from reports of the
regular missions of the IMF in the countries.4 On that
basis, we have classified countries in three groups
according to the extent of reform since 2000 (see
Table 2). Ten countries have shown reform progress,
seven have stalled, and two have had reversals. This
pattern implies that although the process of reforms
has continued in several countries, its pace has
declined even further, and, for the first time since its
inception in the mid-eighties, a few major setbacks
have occurred. A rough calculation suggests that the
overall reform index stayed put at 0.58 between 1999
and 2002 or went slightly up from 0.58 to 0.61 if
Argentina and Venezuela are excluded.
of his military background and populist message,
also spoke during his political campaign in
November 2002 of how neoliberal policies had
brought “disaster” to the country.
In Brazil, the prospect of Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva’s election was also perceived by many as a gen-
eral repudiation of market-oriented reforms. Despite
Lula’s moderate campaign rhetoric and his shift to
the center, investors panicked and sovereign bond
spreads soared prior to the October 2002 election.
Canada’s  National Post remarked, “Brazil’s presi-
dential election represents a final unraveling of the
so-called Washington consensus” (Samuelson 2002).
Yet after Lula assumed office, markets regained con-
fidence in Brazil once it became apparent that his
administration would continue and even deepen the
policies of the Cardoso administration.
Of course, “antineoliberal” campaign rhetoric can
fade once a candidate takes office. Lucio Gutiérrez is
the latest elected leader to pull such an about-face.
He won the presidency in Ecuador with the support
of left-wing and indigenous groups, yet upon taking
office he appointed an orthodox finance minister
and signed an agreement with the IMF that
promised large budget surpluses and opened the
state-controlled energy sector. Gutiérrez is just the
latest president to win a campaign based on populist
antimarket rhetoric only to moderate the message
once in office. During the 1989 Argentine presiden-
tial campaign, Carlos Menem supported a nationalist
and redistributive state-led development model, but
by 1991 he was advocating the free market ortho-
doxy of his opponent. In Peru, Alberto Fujimori fol-
lowed the same pattern in his 1990 campaign against
Mario Vargas Llosa: He attacked Vargas Llosa’s plan
for structural reforms only to adopt virtually the
same measures once in office.
In other words, while the volume of the rhetoric is
up, it has not yet translated into a regionwide trend
of policy rollback. For example, while Argentina’s
President Kirchner may have rejected the neoliberal
policies of the Menem era, his differences with the
The sustainability of Latin American economic
reform will hinge on the beliefs and attitudes of
the main players: voters, policymakers, opinion
leaders, and the international community.4. Details are available upon request to the authors.
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It is important to note that there are more differ-
ences than similarities in the reform reversals of
these two countries. In Argentina, the policy rever-
sals started as a last-resort response to a prolonged
crisis that threatened (and eventually destroyed)
the monetary and financial systems. In Venezuela,
no such crisis was apparent at the beginning of the
antireform process, which was initiated as a political
strategy by the president against the opposition. As
events unfolded in Argentina and the crisis reached
its peak in 2002, public opinion moved strongly in
favor of antimarket policies, which were then given
additional impetus during the 2003 electoral cam-
paign by several candidates, including the winner. In
Venezuela, a severe economic crisis surfaced after
the general strike in late 2002 that was aimed at
removing the president, which gave him further lee-
way to deepen the antimarket policies. However, it is
unclear that these policies have the support of pub-
lic opinion at large while, unlike in Argentina, they
are strongly rejected by the private sector.
The opinion leaders. Opinion leaders are a key
group of players to be considered in the reform
process. Opinion leaders’ views are important for
several reasons. First, leadership within the execu-
tive branch, and, to a lesser extent, the legislature,
increases the probability that a reform proposal will























Progress of Reforms in Latin America (Margin of Reform Put to Use)
Note: Progress in reforms is measured as that part of the potential for reform as of 1985 that was actually used by 1989, 1994, 1999, and 2002.
Source: Lora and Panizza (2002b), updated by the authors; details available upon request. 
Progress Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru
Stalling Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
Reversal Argentina, Venezuela
Source: Lora and Panizza (2002b), updated by the authors; details available upon request.
TABLE 2
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large in eight Latin American countries (although
there are only four countries in common in both
surveys). The two last questions were applied only
in Latin America, and therefore the answers cannot
be compared with those from other regions.
Eighty-three percent of opinion leaders in Latin
America consider the greater opening of national mar-
kets to trade and business with other countries to be
either very good or somewhat good. This percentage
does not differ much from the percentages of other
developing regions although it is somewhat below
that in industrial countries (93 percent; see Figures 4
and 5). However, differences within Latin America
are important: While 94 percent of opinion leaders in
Chile are in favor of trade liberalization, only 70 per-
cent in Colombia are. Furthermore, while in Chile two
of three opinion leaders consider trade opening very
good, in Colombia fewer than one of every five opinion
leaders shares that view. Interestingly, opinion leaders
are less enthusiastic about trade liberalization than
those polled in the four countries where the compari-
son can be made (notice, however, that the wording
of the question was not identical).
Seventy-seven percent of Latin American opinion
leaders are in favor of foreign direct investment in
the manufacturing sector. Again, that percentage is
roughly similar to that of other developing regions but
considerable uncertainty when faced with reform pro-
posals that attempt to substantially alter the status
quo ante, and opinion leaders may be decisive in dis-
pelling or reinforcing doubts about the convenience of
reform (Graham et al. 1999). And third, ex post facto
judgments are often biased and distorted (as we will
see below) and may be susceptible to manipulation by
the opinion leaders. Therefore,  opinion leaders’ views
may influence not only the probability that a reform is
introduced but also the way its effects are perceived
by the public and therefore may make the difference
between sustainability and rejection of the reform.
The Global Poll conducted by Princeton Survey
Research Associates for the World Bank offers the
most recent survey of the views of opinion leaders
on globalization and promarket reform in forty-nine
countries of all world regions, including several
Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Peru). The poll
was conducted between October 2002 and March
2003 through interviews of leaders from govern-
ment, the private sector, the media, civil society,
academia, and trade unions. For our purposes, the
questions of interest are those related to trade lib-
eralization, foreign direct investment, the “neoliberal
model,” and privatization. The first one is compara-





























Worldwide Opinion Leaders’ Support for Opening Markets and Trade, 2002–03
Source: The Global Poll, Princeton Survey Research Associates for the World Bank7 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
lower than in the developed world, where the figure is
89 percent. Differences of opinion between countries
are less pronounced than in the previous question but
are still present: 40 percent of opinion leaders in
Honduras consider foreign companies very good com-
pared with only 12 percent in Mexico (Figure 6).
The majority of opinion leaders in Latin America is
in favor of privatizing inefficient state-owned enter-
prises, from 90 percent in Jamaica to 70 percent in
Chile and Honduras. However, this view is far from a
blanket endorsement of privatization: Many of those
in favor consider that the effect is only “somewhat
positive,” especially in Mexico, Jamaica, and Colombia.
Finally, opinion leaders in the region are divided
with respect to the impact of the “neoliberal eco-
nomic model” on poverty. In Jamaica and Peru a
slight majority believe that the model, defined as
liberal trade policies, privatization, fiscal discipline,
tax reform, property rights reform, and deregula-
tion, can pull people out of poverty. In Brazil,
Colombia, and Honduras, those in favor and those
against are matched, while in Chile and Mexico the
majority does not believe that the model can pull
people out of poverty.
In synthesis, opinion leaders in Latin America on
average have views similar to those of leaders in
other developing regions with respect to trade lib-
eralization and foreign direct investment although
large differences can be found between countries
within the region. Unlike the public at large, opinion
leaders are supportive of privatization, but many
consider that the effects are expected to be only
“somewhat positive.” Opinion leaders are clearly
divided about the impact of the so-called neoliberal
model on poverty. Since they do not oppose the
core elements of that model, which they consider
beneficial for their countries, their views seem to
imply that the reform agenda should not be
reversed but expanded, as has also been the trend
among international organizations.
The international community. The interna-
tional pressure to liberalize was ubiquitous during
the early nineties. “Everywhere state leaders
turned, they were bound to feel this pressure . . . :
they encountered a battery of international schol-
ars, policy advisers, financiers and investors who
demanded market-oriented reforms as a condition
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Latin American Opinion Leaders’ Support for Opening Markets and Trade, 2002–03
Source: The Global Poll, Princeton Survey Research Associates for the World Bank
5. Corrales (2002) cites the following references for discussions of international pressures on behalf of economic liberalization:
Williamson (1994), Kahler (1992, 1994), and Frenkel and O’Donnell (1994).8 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
social security, regulatory, tax, education, and politi-
cal reforms geared toward establishing an institu-
tional foundation that can sustain economic growth.
Finally, equity-improving policies comprise improved
education, titling programs to secure property rights,
land reform, and microcredit (see Williamson 2003a).
The expansion of the agenda represents an impor-
tant change of attitude toward reform because prior-
ity is no longer given to the original set of reforms
over the rest and because policy recommendations in
the original neoliberal agenda have become more
qualified. For instance, emphasis on privatization is
now made conditional on the possibility of adjusting
the institutional and regulatory environment to
reduce the risk of inefficiency, corruption, and reg-
ulatory capture. In a similar way, much greater
emphasis is now placed on the quality of supervi-
sion and prudential regulation as conditions for a
successful financial liberalization process. However,
as discussed below, this expanded agenda is not
free from strong criticism for failing to provide solid
foundations for growth while expanding the reform
requirements beyond the political and practical
capabilities of any government.
Furthermore, a growing number of leading interna-
tional scholars have moved away from the notion that
promarket reform is the essential precondition to
Although much international advice and pressure
are still in favor of promarket policies, such policies
are no longer given the utmost importance in the
policy agendas of the international organizations or
in the views of international advisers or financiers.
During the 1990s the mantra of international
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and
the Inter-American Development Bank was clearly
aligned with the neoliberal model, as defined in the
previous section—liberal trade policies, privatization,
fiscal discipline, tax reform, property rights reform,
and deregulation—and largely reflected the so-called
Washington consensus.6 However, as economic growth
stalled and social indicators failed to improve, espe-
cially during the second half of the decade, the
breadth and scope of the agenda of the international
organizations expanded with four new reform items:
crisis proofing, completing first-generation reforms,
advancing second-generation reforms, and improving
equity. Crisis proofing aims to reduce vulnerability
to crises through such measures as accumulating
budget surpluses and reserves, adopting a flexible
currency, strengthening supervision and regulation,
and increasing domestic savings. Completing first-
generation reforms includes making labor markets
more flexible and deepening privatization and free
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Latin American Opinion Leaders’ Support for Establishment of Foreign Companies, 2002–03
Source: The Global Poll, Princeton Survey Research Associates for the World Bank6. The term originated in a 1986 study issued by the Institute for International Economics titled Toward Renewed Economic
Growth in Latin America, edited by Balassa et al. (see Williamson 2003b, 323).
7. This and the next subsection are an updated version of a survey contained in Lora and Panizza (2002a).
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achieve economic development. Among them are four
influential international advisers. Paul Krugman
shocked the international community when, in the
midst of the Asian crisis of 1997–98, he recommended
the adoption of controls to international capital flows
and other heterodox financial policies (Krugman
1998a, 1998b, 1999). Joseph Stiglitz followed suit with
his strong criticism of the multilaterals’ emphasis on
several key ingredients of the standard stabilization
package, such as interest rate increases and fiscal
restraint. He has also criticized some core components
of the promarket reform agenda, most notoriously
financial liberalization and privatization (Stiglitz 1998,
2002a, 2002b; Chang 2001). In a similar vein, Dani
Rodrik has advanced the thesis that the key ingredi-
ents for economic growth are macro stability (mone-
tary, fiscal, and financial), strong property rights, the
rule of law, and producer incentives aligned with social
costs and benefits—universal principles that do not
necessarily translate into the standard set of pro-
market policies and institutions recommended by
Washington (Rodrik 2003). Jeffrey Sachs has empha-
sized the need for social protection and human capital
accumulation over the standard stabilization-cum-
liberalization approach. His views are partly motivated
by his conviction that geographic limitations play a
more important role in economic and social outcomes
than is generally recognized in the profession (Sachs
2003). However, he has also criticized the lack of a
basis for the standard stabilization package: “Indeed
the phrase ‘debt sustainability analysis’ is truly
Orwellian in scale of distortion. The IMF and World
Bank procedures for measuring sustainability have
absolutely nothing to do with ability to pay and
100 percent to do with the arbitrary limits on debt
relief imposed by the G-7” (Sachs 2000).
Reasons for the Fatigue
A
fter more than a decade of promarket reforms,
symptoms of fatigue are evident: Public opinion
considers the reforms not to have been beneficial;
policymakers in a growing number of countries
seem to have lost their reform zeal, and the process
is now stalling in many countries; and both opinion
leaders and the international community are no
longer unified around the thesis that a set of core
promarket reforms is the key to accelerating devel-
opment. What are the reasons for the fatigue? In
this section we discuss four alternative, though not
mutually exclusive, explanations: (1) the economic
effects of reforms have been modest, (2) reforms
have failed to improve social outcomes, (3) political
forces and public opinion have moved toward the
left, and (4) perception biases and other psycholog-
ical reasons may be behind the loss of appetite for
further reforms.
Economic reasons.7 Increasing productivity and
growth was the main purpose of the promarket
structural reforms. But, although economic growth
in Latin America improved throughout the 1990s, it
was disappointing and less than the averages for the
1960s and 1970s (Table 3). Indeed, whereas during
the so-called lost decade of the 1980s annual
growth in the region was only 1.2 percent and per
capita income fell at a rate of 0.7 percent, in the
1990s those rates rose to 3.8 and 2.1 percent,
respectively. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, aver-
age annual growth was more than 5 percent and per
capita income increased by around 3 percent. 
Something similar may be observed with regard
to trends in total factor productivity. In the 1990s,
total factor productivity contributed practically
nothing to the average growth of countries in the
Total factor
GDP Per capita GDP productivity
growth rate  growth rate  growth rate
1961–70 5.3 2.7 1.0
1971–80 5.5 3.4 –0.3
1981–90 1.2 –0.7 –0.2
1991–99 3.8 2.1 0.1
2000–02 0.6 –1.1
Source: Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2002); World Bank (2001b, 2003)
TABLE 3
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because of instability in the international prices of
the region’s typical exports and because of the major
changes in the amounts and costs of capital
resources for the region. Growth was also affected
by the quality of macroeconomic policies and other
circumstances specific to each country.
Given the multiplicity of factors that can influence
growth and productivity, it is not surprising that
experts have different opinions about the effects of
the reforms. Until a few years ago, the prevailing
opinion on the effectiveness of the reforms was quite
optimistic. Table 4 presents the results of five studies
that evaluate the effects of the reforms. The first
three studies analyze the reforms up to the mid-
1990s and have consistent results (Easterly, Loayza,
and Montiel 1997; Fernández-Arias and Montiel
2001; Lora and Barrera 1997). According to these
studies, the effects were positive and substantial. For
example, using the previously mentioned indexes of
reform, Lora and Barrera find that the reforms had a
significant and ongoing impact on growth, produc-
tivity, and investment. According to their estimates,
until the mid-1990s, the economic reforms raised
Latin America’s growth rate by 1.9 percentage points
(that is, to 2.2 percentage points, including the
impact of macroeconomic stabilization).
More recent studies point to less encouraging
effects. Escaith and Morley (2001), who use a mod-
ified version of the same indexes for 1970–95, also
find a positive effect although it is smaller in magni-
tude and less robust than those reported in previ-
ous articles. By using the same indexes for 1985–99,
Lora and Panizza (2002b) make new estimates of
the reforms’ effects on growth. They find that the
effects were more modest and of a transitory nature
region after having fallen sharply in the 1980s
(when it took away around 2 percentage points of
growth). Productivity improvements typical of the
1990s were not substantially different from those
typical (also very low) of the 1960s and 1970s.
These results could be taken as an indicator that
the reforms failed to achieve their central objective of
speeding up economic growth through more efficient
use of productive resources. Yet this conclusion is far
from warranted. First, it should not be forgotten that
these averages conceal notable differences between
countries in the region. In terms of per capita income,
for example, ten of the twenty-six countries in ques-
tion performed better in the 1990s than in the 1960s
and 1970s. Some countries, such as Argentina, Chile,
Guyana, and El Salvador, had significant increases in
the rate of growth. An equal number of countries also
registered improvements in overall factor produc-
tivity, which outpaced that of the 1960s and 1970s. 
Second, structural reforms significantly differed
from one country to another in terms of depth, pace,
and manner of implementation. Finally, it should be
kept in mind that structural reforms were not the
only factors influencing productivity and growth in
recent decades. In this regard, it should be empha-
sized that growth trends in developed countries and
in the world economy as a whole, which had been
encouraging in the 1950s and 1960s, fell in the fol-
lowing decades. In the 1990s, per capita income
growth in the developed countries was the same as
that in Latin American countries (1.5 percent per
year for Latin America, 1.7 percent for the entire
world), whereas in the 1970s it had been 4.3 percent
(4.1 percent for all countries). The international
context has also limited Latin American countries
Simple average of Weighted average of
selected countries selected countries
Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997)
1991–93 versus 1986–90 2.2 1.7
Lora and Barrera (1997)
1993–95 versus 1987–89 2.2 2.2
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (2001)
1991–95 versus 1986–90 1.6 1.7
Lora and Panizza (2002b)
average 1988–1999 1.0 n.a.
Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón (2002)
1990s versus 1980s 1.3 n.a.
Source: From IDB (2003, chap. 5)
TABLE 4




















Effect of Reforms on Growth (Latin American Average Annual Growth)
Source: Lora and Panizza (2002b)
because they seemed to be diluted after the reforms
were in place for some time. For example, during
their high point (1991–93), the reforms increased
annual growth by 1.3 percentage points. When the
reform period began to slow down, the growth
effect declined considerably, and in 1997–99 it
entailed only 0.6 percentage points of additional
growth (compared with a hypothetical situation
with no further reforms; Figure 7). The study also
finds that the reforms’ effectiveness depended cru-
cially on the institutional environment in which
they took place. In particular, the reforms seem to
have had a greater effect in countries with good rule
of law possibly because it lessened uncertainty
about the new rules and limited the undue interfer-
ence of interest groups in the design and imple-
mentation of regulations. Loayza, Fajnzylber, and
Calderón (2002) also find more modest effects of
the reforms in their update of the estimates of
Easterly, Loayza, and Montiel (1997).
Opening up to international trade is an area of
structural reform whose effects on growth have
been the subject of debate. According to most stud-
ies that make comparisons between countries,
there is a clear and positive correlation between
opening to international trade and economic growth
(Dollar 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995; Frankel and
Romer 1999; Ben-David 1993; Edwards 1998; Dollar
and Kraay 2000). Studies of domestic experiences
reach the same conclusion (see a summary in
Srinivasan and Bhagwati 2001). Although criticisms
have been raised about the validity of some of these
studies,8 no study has suggested that opening up to
trade has adverse effects on growth. Studies more
8. According to Hanson and Harrison (1999) and Rodríguez and Rodrik (2001), the literature that finds a positive relationship
between liberalization and growth is plagued with problems of methodology and data errors, and the results are not particu-
larly solid in comparison with alternative specifications and data series. Rodrik (2000) likewise asserts that, contrary to what
is suggested by Srinivasan and Bhagwati (2001), the evidence for liberalization derived from country studies is far from over-
whelming. Nevertheless, Jones (2001), commenting on the article by Rodríguez and Rodrik, shows that the standard results
of a positive relationship between market opening and growth are quite solid and that few of the results commonly accepted
in the economic literature would pass the strict evidence of solidity of Rodríguez and Rodrik. Wacziarg and Welch (2003) take
up the discussion begun by Rodríguez and Rodrik and find that their criticisms are valid for cross-section analyses, from which
it cannot be concluded that opening helps growth. Nevertheless, time series panel analyses do show high and robust effects
of liberalization on growth.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
quate regulatory framework and political and social
institutions that direct and supervise the activities
of the regulatory boards (World Bank 2001b; IDB
2001). Thus, reforms in the financial and infra-
structure sectors have had positive effects when
the reforms have generated a climate favorable to
competition and an adequate regulatory system.
When these conditions are met, the effect that the
financial reform and the privatization of  key infra-
structure sectors have on growth can be substantial
(Mattoo, Rathindran, and Subramanian 2001).
Despite the differences between the various
studies, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the
reforms have had a positive but modest effect on
growth. Even considering the more optimistic cal-
culations, which place the effect at close to 2 points
of additional growth, the reforms by themselves
could not have raised per capita growth from –0.7
percent in the 1980s to rates around 3 percent, like
those seen in the 1960s and 1970s. One of the rea-
sons for the modest impact of the reforms may have
been that they were incomplete, did not have
enough internal institutional support, and took
place in an unstable international environment,
especially in the realm of financing, which in turn
may have compromised national macroeconomic
policies. This debate suggests that the reforms
changed the operation of the economy less than is
generally assumed and hence their impact on pro-
ductivity was muted. 
This view has inspired the extension of the
Washington consensus to several other areas of
reform, as summarized above, an approach that is
not immune to serious criticism because it places
demands on reform that are beyond the political
and practical possibilities of any government and it
fails to convey any sense of priority and even direc-
tion. According to Rodrik (2003), jump-starting
growth and sustaining growth are two separate
enterprises. The former seldom requires such a
wide array of policy changes, and it is unclear that
the latter must be necessarily based on that combi-
nation of policies. He notes that several celebrated
cases of economic success, most notably in Asia,
seem to defy the standard policy prescriptions of
either the Washington consensus or its extended
version. Both South Korea and Taiwan relied upon
public enterprises and utilized industrial policies
including directed credit, trade protection, export
subsidization, and tax incentives, while China grafted
a market system onto its planned economy.
The fact that reforms had a modest impact on
productivity and growth may be at the core of the
reform fatigue even if its effects were positive.
specifically focused on Latin America also find a
positive relationship between liberalization and
growth (Lora and Barrera 1997; Stallings and Peres
2000; Loayza, Fajnzylber, and Calderón 2002).
Empirical research on the effects of financial lib-
eralization has shown that while it does not con-
tribute to an increase in savings (Bandiera 2000), it
does increase financial deepening that, in turn, is
associated with growth (Levine 2001).9 In particular,
cross-country analyses indicate that severe finan-
cial repression (measured by the presence of large
negative real interest rates) adversely affects pro-
ductivity growth. Country-level studies for Ecuador,
Mexico, Chile, and Indonesia also indicate that
financial liberalization leads to a more efficient allo-
cation of capital and relaxes credit constraints
faced by small firms (Harris, Schiantarelli, and
Siregar 1994; Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss
1996; Gelos and Werner 1999; Gallego and Loayza
2001).10 However, research has also shown that
financial liberalization may lead to crisis because
the previous system of interest rate controls and
directed credit may have created weak bank portfo-
lios and not promoted a good “credit culture.” This
possibility suggests that postliberalization financial
crises are due less to the liberalization per se than
to the preliberalization environment, the sequenc-
ing of financial reforms, and the legal, regulatory,
and supervisory structures (Caprio, Hanson, and
Honohan 2001).
Given that state-owned enterprises can correct
market failures, one would expect that the advan-
tages of public enterprises are greater in developing
countries, where market failures are more pervasive
than in developed countries. If such were the case,
privatization would be less beneficial for welfare
and growth in the developing countries. The empir-
ical evidence, however, seems to suggest that the
opposite is true,11 implying that government fail-
ures have the upper hand over market failures even
though, as in the case of financial liberalization, a
successful privatization process requires an ade-
Promarket reforms stand accused of being
one of the causes of the economic crisis that
Latin America is suffering. The attitude of
Latin Americans toward promarket reforms
has become increasingly critical.9. Reforms that eliminate negative real interest rates seem to have the largest impact on growth.
10. Laeven (2000) supplies cross-country evidence for the fact that financial liberalization relaxes the financial constraints faced
by small firms but does not affect large firms. 
11. Shirley and Walsh (2000) survey fifty-two studies of the impact of privatization on economic efficiency and welfare and find
that thirty-two studies concluded that privatization is welfare-enhancing, fifteen studies find an ambiguous effect of privati-
zation, and five studies found a negative effect of privatization. However, out of twenty studies that covered developing coun-
tries, seventeen found that privatization is welfare-improving and three found an ambiguous effect of privatization, but no
study found a negative effect of privatization in developing countries.
12. Given that some reforms emphasize greater international trade and capital account openness, very often the process of
reform is identified with the term “globalization.”
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Many people probably formed their expectations
of reforms’ benefits on the basis of the reformers’
promises and announcements as well as the prevailing
views at the beginning of the process, which were
certainly overoptimistic, as we have seen. As people
have later corrected those expectations according
to the actual results, they may consider that there
are better policy packages to deal with the problem
of low growth. Therefore, even if they do not
demand a reform reversal, they become less com-
mitted to the original reform process. If this view is
correct, policymakers who oversold the potential
benefits of the reforms could now be blamed for the
reform fatigue. Interestingly, this phenomenon does
not seem to be exclusive to Latin America. It is also
happening in East European countries in spite of
the fact that, over the last decade, some of them
have had a very good growth performance (Central
European University 2003). But it should be even
more valid for Latin America because, contrary to
the typical East European case, where the initial
effect of the structural reforms was a decline in
incomes (Merlevede 2003), reforms in Latin America
produced initial growth gains that turned out to be
temporary (Lora and Panizza 2002b).
Another explanation, however, is that opinion on
the effectiveness of reforms is not based on complete
information on its expected and actual results but
rather on a rough association between reform and
macroeconomic outcomes, as illustrated in the oft-
cited, though not very polite, quote: “It’s the econ-
omy, stupid.” Using Latinobarómetro data, Panizza
and Yáñez (2003) find that several macroeconomic
variables affect attitudes toward privatization and
the market economy (the only two questions that
have been included in at least four annual surveys).
The variables tested are the deviation of GDP from
its trend (a simple way of capturing the economic
cycle), the depth of the economic crisis (defined as
the deviation of GDP from its trend when it is below
it and zero otherwise), the unemployment rate, and
the inflation rate (computed as the loss of purchas-
ing power of a domestic currency unit). Except for
inflation, the other three variables influence people’s
attitudes in the expected way and are able to explain
a substantial part of the loss of support for the
reforms. As we have seen, support for privatization
went from 52 percent in 1998 to 25 percent in 2003.
One third of that decline seems to be associated with
the economic cycle, according to their calculations.
The case of Argentina is a striking example of the
importance of macroeconomic factors. In this coun-
try, such factors explain a drop in support of privati-
zation equivalent to 25 percentage points, which is
about 80 percent of the observed drop (from 45 per-
cent to 13 percent) in the support for privatization
in that country.
In sum, economic reasons are clearly behind
reform fatigue. Although the reforms seem to have
increased incomes and growth, they did so in a
modest way, probably below the expectations created
by the reformers. However, as growth has recently
faltered for short-term reasons, support for reform
has declined because many people are probably
unable to isolate the influence of the cycle from the
permanent effect of the reforms.
Social outcomes as reasons for the reform
fatigue. While a majority of economists agree that
most of the structural reforms described above tend
to increase average income, those who criticize
these kinds of reforms emphasize their distributional
consequences and claim that they generate a pat-
tern of economic growth that benefits only the richest
segments of the population.12
The most quoted papers holding the view that
reforms tend to be beneficial for the majority of the
population are Gallup, Radelet, and Warner (1998),
Dollar and Kraay (2000, 2002), and a recent World
Bank report (2001b). The basic point of these
papers is that reforms (especially trade openness
and globalization) increase economic growth with-
out producing major income distribution shifts.
Therefore, these authors conclude that the increase
in average income brought about by economic lib-
eralization is fully translated into an increase in the
income of the poor.
While these authors present strong evidence in
support of the fact that growth is distribution neutral,14 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
atively abundant factor of production. Given that
most developing countries are abundant in unskilled
labor, which is also the factor of production con-
trolled by the poor, one would expect trade openness
to improve income distribution and hence improve
the relative (and not only the absolute) well-being of
the poor. However, the distributional effect of
reforms is extremely complex. In some countries
external tariffs focused on labor-intensive products,
as in the case of Mexico (Hanson and Harrison 1999);
in other countries the most abundant factor of pro-
duction is land or natural resources.
Much has been said about the short-run impact
of trade liberalization and other structural reforms
on employment and unemployment. Undoubtedly,
the widely held perception that the reforms were
detrimental to workers is behind the opposition of
the public to the so-called neoliberal agenda. One
of the best efforts to gather opinions on the labor and
social impact of the reforms was recently undertaken
by the Structural Adjustment Participatory Review
International Network (SAPRIN) (2002), which used
participatory methods to examine the experiences
of nine countries, three of them in Latin America.14
According to this study, the effects of the structural
reforms on labor have been predominantly negative:
• “Domestic manufacturing sectors and employ-
ment have been hit hard by indiscriminate
import liberalization [while] increased exports
have failed to generate significant domestic eco-
nomic activity and employment” (174–76).
• “Coupled with trade liberalization measures,
financial-sector reforms have had a particularly
devastating impact on small and medium-sized
firms and the large number of jobs they pro-
vide” (175).
• “Unemployment and job insecurity have increased
and working conditions have often deteriorated
with the increase in privatizations and the intro-
duction of flexibilization measures” (180).
Likewise, an ambitious participatory project
(Narayan and Petesch 2002) recently carried out by
the World Bank in twenty-three countries (four of
them Latin American) gathered the opinions of
poor people, who clearly stated their concern about
the effects of the reforms on labor:
• “Depending on the country, poor people men-
tioned privatization, factory closures, the open-
ing of domestic markets . . . and other related
changes as having depleted their assets and
increased their insecurity” (471–72). 
Ravallion (2001) shows that, by going beyond aver-
ages, one discovers that there are large differences
among countries in how much growth benefits the
poor. In particular, he points out that the drop in the
poverty rate brought about by a 1 percent increase
in the growth of average household income can
range between 0.6 and 3.5 percent. At the same
time, Foster and Székely (2001) show that when
one uses an index that emphasizes the income of
the poor, the latter does not grow one-for-one with
average income but considerably less. This last
result seems to indicate that reforms may hurt
some groups with very low income and hence, while
they do help in reducing overall poverty, they may
worsen income distribution among the poor. There
is, therefore, a role for policies that take into
account the distributional impact of growth.
The IDB (1997) finds that structural reforms led
to a slight improvement in income distribution and
that trade reforms were not regressive (in the sense
that they did not contribute to worsening income
distribution). However, Behrman, Birdsall, and
Székely (2000) study wage differentials in Latin
America and find that during 1980 through 1998
economic reform had a short-run disequalizing
effect.13 One of their main results is that, while
domestic financial market reforms, capital account
liberalization, and tax reforms widened wage
inequality, privatization narrowed wage inequality.
At the same time, they find no significant impact of
trade openness on wage inequality. Spilimbergo,
Londoño, and Széleky (1999) find that, on average,
trade openness increases inequality and that the
effect is stronger in countries where physical capi-
tal is relatively scarce.
The fact that economic reforms (especially trade
openness) may increase inequality in developing
countries seems to go against standard economic
theory (or at least economic theory rooted in the
simplest version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of
international trade), which suggests that trade open-
ness should increase the income accruing to the rel-
Eighty-three percent of opinion leaders in
Latin America consider the greater opening
of national markets to trade and business
with other countries to be either very good
or somewhat good.13. Morley (2000) finds small regressive effects of reforms. He points out that while tax and trade reforms tend to be regres-
sive, financial reforms are progressive.
14. See SAPRIN (2002). The countries included are Bangladesh, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Hungary, Mexico, the Philippines,
Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
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• “In all four countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean, people described the economic and
social devastation of their communities in the
wake of macroeconomic crises and policy
reforms. They felt directly harmed by numerous
plant closures, the shift to a service economy,
and the rise of the informal economy” (474). 
• “A common theme underlies the sentiments
expressed by men and women . . . in Argentina:
the quality of their lives has deteriorated. In
urban areas, they attribute the decline mostly to
unemployment and crime. In their words, a dra-
matic picture emerges of the personal and social
consequences of market reforms and factory
closures” (335). 
• And in Ecuador, “many urban study participants
say the 1990s brought deep declines in their well-
being, and they express little support for the eco-
nomic reforms made by the government” (400).
In spite of these opinions, no study has been able
to provide support for the belief that import liberal-
ization increases unemployment or reduces (aggre-
gate) employment. If anything, the opposite is found.
Interestingly, trade liberalization seems to have pro-
duced very little employment reallocation either
between the tradable and nontradable sectors or
within them (IDB 2003). The impact of privatization
on unemployment has also been overstated. Even in
countries where layoffs in privatized countries were
massive, the effect on overall unemployment was
small. The dismissal of nearly 150,000 workers in
Argentina as a result of privatization between 1987
and 1997 can account for only 13 percent of the
increase in unemployment during the same period.
However, between 80 and 90 percent of the personal
cuts were offset by new jobs in the same sectors, leav-
ing a very small net unemployment effect. Similar
results are obtained for other big privatizers, such as
Bolivia, Mexico, or Peru (McKenzie and Mookherjee
2003). Furthermore, though work conditions in the
privatized firms often deteriorated, wages seem to
have gone up substantially, as has become clear at
least in the cases of Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.
Therefore, the social losses appear to concentrate in
those laid off who were not reinstated directly or indi-
rectly in the privatized firms. Many of the people laid
off moved to the informal sector with earnings sub-
stantially below their previous wages (IDB 2003).
As we have seen, the social consequences of
reforms can hardly be used as factual support for the
reform fatigue. Although there is no consensus on
some of the distributional effects, the prevalent view
among the researchers is that these effects were
mild. And in spite of all the fuss about the employ-
ment implications of trade liberalization and privati-
zation, there is very scant evidence to support it. 
However, as discussed in connection with the
economic reasons, people’s views are not necessar-
ily formed on the basis of the indicators and models
used by economists. In forming their opinion about
the social and distributional consequences of the
reforms, people may attach important weight to
some observations that may not be representative
of the general outcome. This behavior stems from
two reasons. First, people tend to compare their
own economic situation with the situations of their
immediate “reference group” (neighbors, peers, rel-
atives, etc.) rather than with society at large. As a
result of this “rivalry effect,” people resent it when
others in their reference group do better than
themselves even if all are becoming better off or if
income concentration for the society as a whole is
improving. “That is why there was so little economic
discontent [in Europe] during the Second World
War. By contrast, the great inflation of the 70s cre-
ated great discontent because throughout most of
the year other people’s wages were raising rapidly,
while one’s own wage was constant” (Layard 2003,
8). The second reason is the high visibility of the
consumption patterns of those at the very top. In
the “winner-take-all-society,” a few at the top in
some professions (especially arts, sports, and some
other businesses) make astoundingly high incomes
and consume accordingly, gaining the attraction of
the media and the public opinion (Frank and Cook
Opinion leaders’ views seem to imply that the
reform agenda should not be reversed but
expanded, as has also been the trend among
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less constant since 1996, but the share of those who
define themselves as being of the extreme right
increased during the two crisis years of 1998 and
2001. During the 1998 crisis, left extremism also
peaked in Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador.
To further explore the political reasons behind
the rejection of reform, it is useful to look at the
socioeconomic characteristics and the political
opinions of those who are against reforms. From a
political economy point of view, we are interested to
see if the rejection is more concentrated among
specific socioeconomic groups and if those who
oppose reforms share other opinions or attitudes
with respect to the political institutions.
To identify who is against the reforms, we draw
from results by Panizza and Yáñez (2003), who have
used the Latinobarómetro data to run a set of
regressions in which the dependent variables are the
indicators of attitude toward reforms and the
explanatory variables are socioeconomic variables.16
Their results show that men tend to be more sup-
portive of promarket reforms than women (the dif-
ference ranges between 1 and 5 percentage points)
and that wealth and education tend to be associated
with more support for reforms (an individual who
belongs to the top quintile of the wealth distribution
and who holds a university degree is 20 percentage
1995). Both the rivalry effect and the winner-take-
all effects may have had deleterious effects on Latin
Americans’ opinion on reforms because economic
liberalization created new opportunities, opened the
way to greater social and economic mobility, and
facilitated the adoption of conspicuous patterns of
consumption by those able to afford them.
Political reasons for the fatigue. One possi-
ble cause (or consequence) of the decrease in sup-
port toward promarket reforms may be an overall
movement of the population toward the left. This
may be part of a global trend with the end of the
Reagan-Thatcher era and the beginning of a new
worldwide movement toward the left following,
with a lag, the leadership of Bill Clinton and Tony
Blair. Latinobarómetro allows us to investigate this
hypothesis because it includes a question on the
respondent political orientation. In particular, it
asks: “On a scale of 0 to 10 how right wing are you?”
(0 being the most left wing and 10 the most right
wing). The results for this question do not point to
any change in political orientation and, if anything,
they would show a small movement toward the
right.15 Panizza and Yáñez (2003) have also used
these data to study the behavior of extremists. They
have found that the share of those who define
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Public Opinion Support in Latin America for Reform, by Wealth Levels, 1996–2003
Source: Latinobarómetro survey data from Panizza and Yáñez (2003)15. The average values are 5.33 (1996), 5.53 (1997), 5.58 (1998), 5.33 (2000), 5.87 (2001), and 5.52 (2003). 
16. All the regressions also include country-fixed effects and country-specific time effects. To make the results more intuitive,
the regressions were estimated using a linear probability model. Probit estimations yield similar results. 
17. However, this finding could also mean that those who benefit from reforms are also those who benefit from an electoral
system that does not work well but that, in their opinion, is fair and clean.
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points more likely to support economic integration
than an individual who belongs to the bottom quin-
tile and has no education) (see Figure 8). However,
education and wealth are only weakly correlated to
the support for privatization and a free market.
With respect to political orientation, those who
describe themselves as being just to the right of the
center tend to be more supportive of promarket
reforms than those who describe themselves as
being left to the center or to either extreme of the
political spectrum (even though those at the
extreme right are more supportive of reforms than
those at the extreme left; see Figure 9). Given this
weak correlation between political orientation and
attitude toward reforms, it is not surprising to find
that changes in public opinion toward reforms were
not associated with a net movement to the left of
the electorate.
The support for reforms tends to be associated
with other political views. Those who think that
elections are clean are between 3 percent and 8 per-
cent more likely to be in favor of economic integra-
tion and privatization. This finding is important
because it may mean that a clean and well-working
democratic system could make the reform process
more sustainable.17 Interestingly, those who per-
ceive that corruption is a serious problem are more
in favor of economic openness (they support eco-
nomic integration and think that FDIs are beneficial
for the country). This result supports the findings
of Ades and Di Tella (1999), who show that open-
ness can help in reducing corruption. At the same
time, those who think that corruption is a serious
problem tend to be more skeptical of the privatiza-
tion process and the working of the private sector.
This finding is in line with the conclusions of Lora
and Panizza (2002b), who argue that privatization
works better in countries characterized by low levels
of corruption.
Whether the support for reforms has waned or
not, there is the perception that those who oppose
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Public Opinion Support in Latin America for Reform, by Political Orientation, 1996–2003
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fully committed to carrying through with them. . . .
[Otherwise] they are hesitant to cooperate, not
because they fear losing, but because they fear
being cheated by other players who fail to do their
part” (Corrales 2002, 32). Reforms are therefore
more likely to lose the support of the public in coun-
tries where confidence in political parties is low and
when implemented by personalistic governments or
by unpopular or unstable parties. A related argu-
ment is that, since political parties do not reflect
but rather shape the preferences and responses of
the electorate, cohesive parties increase the sus-
tainability of reforms, especially when aligned with
the executive (Corrales 2002).
On the basis of this reasoning, Panizza and Yáñez
(2003) have tested whether there is a relationship
between support for reforms and trust in political par-
ties. They have measured trust and identification with
political parties with two variables taken from the
Latinobarómetro. The first measures the level of trust
in political parties on a scale from 1 to 4 (where 4
means a great deal of trust in political parties). The
second measures identification with political parties
on a similar scale (4 if the respondent feels very iden-
tified with political parties). Figure 10 shows that
there is a strong and positive correlation between
support for reforms and trust in political parties. The
results indicate that an individual that fully trusts
political parties is 14 percentage points more likely to
support the market economy than an individual who
does not trust political parties (and 20 percentage
points more likely to support privatization). While
there has not been a substantial drop in trust and
identification in political parties, the association
between trust and political parties and support in
reforms (in particular, support for the market econ-
omy) has become stronger, marginally helping to
explain the increased rejection to promarket reforms.
As we will discuss below, the adoption of structural
reforms has apparently taken a heavy toll on the
parties that pursued them while in power, which is
consistent with this result.
In summary, there are linkages between socio-
economic characteristics and political support for
promarket reforms. However, those variables do not
go a long way toward explaining why rejection of
reform has increased through time. The shift in
public opinion is not due to a profound change in
political views or to an increase in the ability of
those opposed to push their position through but is
due, as discussed before, to short-term economic
circumstances. Although this explanation may be a
good omen for the future of reforms, it is not entirely
clear that acceptance of market-friendly policies
message through and to gain influence in the decision-
making process. To assess the validity of this per-
ception, Panizza and Yáñez (2003) have checked
whether there are differences in political partici-
pation between those who support and those who
oppose reforms. In general, those who support
reforms are more interested in politics than those
who oppose reforms. This finding is not surprising
because there is a positive correlation between
interest in politics and education and, in turn, a pos-
itive correlation between education and support for
reforms, but it should be noted that the positive
correlation between support for reform and interest
in politics is rather weak.
Going beyond the declared interest in politics,
Panizza and Yáñez (2003) have also explored
whether those who oppose reforms are more likely
to get involved in what they call “violent political
activities.”18 Their results show that those who
oppose reforms are between 1 and 2.5 percentage
points (corresponding to a 10 percent difference)
more likely to participate in this kind of activity.
While this finding lends support to the idea that
those who oppose reforms tend to “make more
noise” than those who support reforms, it should be
recognized that the difference is rather small.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that those who
are against reform have become more involved in
this type of activity in recent years.
Loss of credence of political parties may be
another political reason behind the lack of support
for reforms. Scholars of economic development
argue that political parties are important in the
reform process because of their programmatic ori-
entation and because they may facilitate the
process of aggregating diverse views and striking
compromises for the adoption of reforms (Corrales
2002; Graham et al. 1999). However, parties may
also be important for the sustainability of reforms
because they can help build credibility and reduce
skepticism. “For economic agents to cooperate with
the reforms, they must be persuaded that the state is
Emphasis on privatization is now made con-
ditional on the possibility of adjusting the
institutional and regulatory environment to
reduce the risk of inefficiency, corruption,
and regulatory capture.18. The index ranges between 0 and 1 and is built as the principal component of a set of questions that ask whether the indi-
vidual has ever participated in violent demonstrations, occupation, lootings, etc. 
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will revive when and if these economies recover
since negative attitudes will likely tend to linger,
making the acceptance of further reforms difficult
even when the current crisis subsides.
Psychological reasons. Neither the economic
nor the social consequences of structural reforms
can explain the attitude of the public toward them.
Nor is there any evidence that Latin Americans are
moving ideologically toward the left, which would
imply a reduced appetite for the market vis-à-vis the
state. The only evidence that helps explain to some
extent the lack of support for reforms is the recent
deterioration of macroeconomic conditions in the
region. Given the insufficiency of our previous
explanations, we conclude our exploration of possi-
ble causes for the reform fatigue with some very ten-
tative hypotheses based on behavioral economics.
Some analysts have turned to cognitive psychol-
ogy to explain why structural reform becomes
bogged down. Pioneering research by Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) found that individuals are more will-
ing to take risks in order to recover a loss than when
they are seeking to protect their gains. Weyland
(2002) argues that this pattern can explain why pres-
idents tend to back away from structural reform pro-
grams even after having administered a successful
“shock” program of structural reform. If the initial
reform overcomes an acute economic crisis and
restores stability, presidents are less motivated in a
stable environment to push for additional reforms
than they were during the initial crisis. According to
this hypothesis, once the recovery has taken place,
leaders become less willing to take risks. Weyland
suggests that this was precisely the case in the early
1990s in both Argentina and Peru: After both
economies recovered following bold reforms, presi-
dents Menem and Fujimori became more risk averse,
and the process of structural adjustment slowed.
More recently, finance minister Fernando
Henrique Cardoso introduced the Real plan when
Brazil was suffering from high inflation in 1994, but
once he became president the following year the
reform process slowed considerably during his two
terms in office. In Ecuador, President Mahuad initi-
ated a process of dollarization during a severe crisis
that helped stabilize the economy; however, the
structural reforms that would enhance the viability
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Public Opinion Support in Latin America for Reform by Those Who Trust Political Parties, 1996–2003
Note: The reference group is those who do not trust political parties.
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biases are universal aspects of human behavior. One
is “confirmatory bias,” that is, the tendency to mis-
interpret ambiguous evidence as confirming exist-
ing hypotheses or beliefs. Experiments performed
by psychologists show that if people have different
initial beliefs when they receive the same additional
information, their views tend not to converge but to
become more polarized as they process that infor-
mation selectively to confirm their initial beliefs.
The second universal behavior is “self-serving bias,”
that is, people’s tendency to believe the hypothesis
that best serves their interests. An implication of
this bias is the tendency to attribute success to
one’s own effort but failure to external forces, such
as bad luck or ill-intentioned behavior of others
(Pinker 2002, chap. 15).
The implications of these biases can be devastat-
ing for the sustainability of reform. Pernice and
Sturzenegger (2003) have argued that, in the case
of Argentina, these biases are at the root of the
social resistance to reform. In spite of the initial
success of privatization and foreign direct invest-
ment deregulation in the early nineties, even before
the Tequila crisis of 1995, people were already
focusing on the (alleged) negative outcomes of
those reforms, such as unemployment and wealth
concentration. A series of well-known events pro-
vided further ammunition to those antimarket
beliefs, polarizing public opinion and reinforcing a
deep-rooted position against both free markets and
foreign influences. As the authors conclude, “it is
then perfectly consistent with these cognitive biases
that people will turn against a successful reform
process if the principles of these reforms are at
odds with their self-serving view of the world.”
Therefore, cognitive psychology offers some
hypotheses that may help explain the lack of sup-
port for reform. They are related to some principles
of behavior toward risk—namely, that when con-
fronted with losses, people are better prepared to
assume risks than when they find themselves in a
situation that they consider normal—and some uni-
versal cognitive biases: confirmation bias and self-
serving bias. Since only casual evidence has been
advanced in favor of these hypotheses, their actual
relevance is an open question.
Implications of Reform Fatigue
W
hether we can identify the causes for the
reform fatigue or not, a major concern arises:
The loss of popular support for promarket reforms
and the lack of appetite in the political arena for the
neoliberal model may be signaling an increasing risk
of a backlash. Even if the reform process is not
Of course, a crisis is no guarantee that significant
structural reforms will occur; Argentina since 2001
is an example. However, Weyland’s point is that, in
an atmosphere of crisis, politicians generally find
greater public acceptance of reform, but once sta-
bility returns, that support can erode. During the
past half decade there has been weak economic
growth, but full-blown crises have occurred only in
a handful of countries (Argentina, Ecuador,
Uruguay, and Venezuela). Consequently, this rela-
tive stability, combined with growing dissatisfaction
with reforms already in place, did not create a
receptive climate for reform. On the contrary, the
recent economic downturn in the region has created
a fertile environment for political actors who
oppose the process of structural reform.
Another psychological reason may help explain
the rejection of promarket reforms when countries
are away from the pressure of an economic crisis.
Most people tend to prefer outcomes that are
known with certainty to be positive over the uncer-
tain possibility of a much larger benefit even when
the expected value of the latter is much bigger
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). The popular saying
“better the devil you know” implies a psychological
bias in favor of the status quo ante, which can help
explain popular resistance to any type of reform.
However, in the case of promarket reform, this bias
can also help explain the rejection of the reforms
once implemented because a larger role for the
markets vis-à-vis the state implies that people are
faced with more risks (Rodrik 1997). Even if the
aggregate outcome is welfare enhancing, many peo-
ple may prefer the previous situation in which
uncertainty was lower. Furthermore, willingly
exposing people to risks without offering them the
means of protection is considered unethical or at
least unfair by many people (Schwartz 1998).
Psychology may offer another fundamental rea-
son why, after a trial period, most people tend to
reject reforms even when they are relatively suc-
cessful: cognitive biases. Two types of cognitive
According to most studies that make compar-
isons between countries, there is a clear and
positive correlation between opening to inter-
national trade and economic growth.21 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
reversed, the economic and social benefits of what
has been done so far largely depend on further
reforms in order to give institutional support to pre-
vious liberalization measures (the so-called second
generation reforms) and to advance social policy
reform. The future of the reform process therefore
depends on political support, not only to maintain
the reforms already implemented, but also to pur-
sue these additional reforms.
The political costs of promarket reform.
This section explores the political implications of
reform fatigue. We start by addressing a central
question: What has been the electoral payoff of the
reforms? If the electorate rewards parties that pur-
sue promarket reforms, political selection will tend
to deepen the reform process. But if the electorate
punishes the reformers, those who want the
process to be halted or derailed will stand a better
chance of achieving that.
Theories of political economy provide strong
arguments to explain why structural reforms may
be difficult to implement and may carry political
costs. Reforms must defy the status quo ante and
reallocate income among different social groups
(Rodrik 1994). Most likely, while those who stand to
gain from the reforms are a diverse and disorga-
nized group, the losers are a smaller group, often
organized and politically vocal, intent on protecting
its interests. Reforms are also opposed because
their effects are uncertain, both at the macro and
the micro levels. Uncertainty about the allocation of
losses among the members of the group most
affected can elicit ex ante opposition even if the
overall payoff for the group is positive (Fernández
and Rodrik 1991). These potential political costs
can be outweighed by the benefits of the reforms,
which come from the improvement in macroeco-
nomic conditions (lower inflation, higher growth,
less unemployment). According to political economy
theory, the chances of reform improve when the
expected benefits are large enough to tilt the polit-
ical balance against those who oppose reform. For
this reason, reform is more likely in the midst of a
crisis (Alesina and Drazen 1991; Drazen and Grilli
1993; Rodrik 1994.).
Since these economic theories concentrate on
the ex ante political costs of reform, their argu-
ments are less adequate to explain the resistance to
reforms already implemented. But political scien-
tists have advanced several hypotheses to explain
the ex post political payoff of the reforms. They
argue that the payoff must be positive when the
reforms have been implemented in response to a
crisis and are followed by higher growth (and other
desirable macroeconomic outcomes) that may be
viewed by the public as a consequence of the
reforms. The reasons for these hypotheses are the
principles of behavior toward risk and the limited
understanding by most people of the actual work-
ings of the economy, as mentioned above. Using case
studies for a handful of Latin American countries,
Stokes (2001) finds support for these arguments.
He also finds that the response of the electorate is
not independent of the preelectoral campaign
promises of the incumbent. The voters do punish
the “switchers” who opt to implement promarket
reforms after having campaigned against them.
Therefore, lying may be a good bet ex post facto but
only if the reforms do deliver substantially better
macroeconomic results.
Lora and Olivera (2004) attempt to test the
validity of these hypotheses with the outcomes of
nearly forty presidential elections in seventeen
countries between the mideighties and the end of
the nineties. According to their results, a party that
has been in power gains votes if the rate of inflation
is reduced during its term but loses votes if pro-
market reforms are adopted. Their estimates suggest
that if inflation is reduced, say, from 100 percent to
zero during the term of the administration, the elec-
toral payoff is a handsome doubling in the vote
share for the party. Such large reductions in infla-
tion are not common, however (the average reduc-
tion in the sample is just 9 percent). In contrast,
when a government pursues aggressive structural
reforms, say, an increase in the reform index of 0.24
points (which corresponds to the average increase
in the index in the entire 1985–99 period, as we
have seen above), the electorate punishes the
incumbent’s party by slashing about a quarter of its
votes. (However, the typical amount of reform rep-
resents just 0.08 points of gain in the reform index,
with a correspondingly lower electoral cost).
These results support the widely held view that
aggressive liberalization policies are more easily pur-
sued from a political point of view when combined
The perception of increased inequality may have
reinforced the views opposed to promarket
reforms in spite of the fact that the association
between those outcomes and the reforms is
extremely weak.22 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Second Quarter 2004
role for markets than a decade ago, which implies
that the stakes of investors and other market par-
ticipants are also much larger.
This larger role of the market does not mean, how-
ever, that investors are always in favor of promarket,
neutral economic policies. On the contrary, a real con-
cern for the future of reforms is that the appetite of
private firms for (and ability to get) interventionist
policies seems to have increased in recent years. In
their annual surveys of 100 firms per country, the
World Economic Forum poses this question: “When
deciding upon policies and contracts government
officials usually: favor well-connected firms (=1) . . .
are neutral among firms and individuals (=7).”
Figure 11 shows the average responses in the eleven
Latin American countries surveyed in both 1999 and
2002. In eight countries the responses signaled a sig-
nificant decline in the neutrality of policies.19 The
only exceptions were Chile, Brazil, and Mexico.
However, domestic firms are only one group of stake-
holders in the reform process. International financial
investors are another, and one of no little importance,
given the high levels of external indebtedness of most
Latin American countries. Have these investors also
become more lenient?
International financiers’ sensibility to
reform retrenchments. Have international markets
become more tolerant of unorthodox economic pol-
icy announcements? How do international markets
respond to presidential elections when leading can-
didates promise to halt or reverse the process of
structural reform? A brief survey of the region’s most
recent elections—in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador—
is not conclusive but suggests that investors have
become more tolerant to those announcements. To
analyze the linkages between international market
sensitivity and preelectoral uncertainty, we look at
the country risk premia.20
The economic collapse of Argentina in 2001 and
the subsequent ineffectiveness of the Duhalde
administration led to a general perception that only
a new government could begin to resolve the coun-
try’s problems. This perception exists despite the
fact that the leading candidate for president, Nestor
Kirchner, promised a greater role in the state econ-
omy and fiercely criticized Argentina’s neoliberal
economic path. After Kirchner’s election, bond
spreads fell from the 7,000 trading range to the
5,000 range, indicating some hope that the debt sit-
uation would be resolved under his leadership.
In Ecuador, as the political campaign heated up
in 2002, bond spreads widened only slightly. The
response of the bond market was minimal despite
the fact that the winner, Lucio Gutierrez, a 2000
with an anti-inflationary package, as happened in
Argentina and Peru at the beginning of the nineties.
The results are also consistent with the fact that vir-
tually all governments have tried to protect price
stability at all costs during the last decade. These
results imply as well that promarket reforms, being
politically costly, are bound to hit a political wall
because the parties that backed them in the past
may be in retrenchment and that the whole party
system may now be more fragmented in many coun-
tries than it was a decade ago, partly as a result of
those policies. As we have mentioned, case studies
suggest that these political costs may be lower
when the reforms are pursued in response to a cri-
sis, when they are in line with the incumbent’s pre-
electoral promises, and when growth picks up. That
seems to be the case, but the evidence found by
Lora and Olivera in support of these claims is tenta-
tive at best.
Do all these results imply that the reforms are
doomed to be stalled or, even worse, that a reform
reversal should be expected? Not necessarily. First
of all, it is not clear whether different types of
reforms carry similar political costs. Lora and
Olivera find that the costs seem to be much more
clearly associated with the adoption of trade liber-
alization reforms than with any of the other four
reform areas considered—financial liberalization,
tax reform, privatization, and labor reform. Since
trade liberalization happens to be the area where
the potential for reform has been most exploited,
deepening the rest of the first generation reforms or
pursuing second generation reforms may turn out
to be less politically costly or even beneficial.
Second, our knowledge of the political costs of
reform is based almost entirely upon the experience
of reform adoptions and advances. It would be a big
leap to assume that reform reversals produce cor-
respondingly large political benefits. Remember
that a basic tenet of the political economy theory of
reform is that changing the status quo is politically
costly. Today’s status quo is based on a much larger
Politics is bound to play the decisive role in the
future of reform because the parties that have
pursued them have paid a hefty electoral cost.19. The change in those eight countries was more than twice the standard deviation of the eleven values in 1999, suggesting
that there was a real change of perception, not just a random change in the responses in the different countries.
20. The indicator for country risk is the interest rate spread in basis points between the country’s emerging market bond index
over thirty-year U.S. treasuries.
21. For an analysis of the “Lula effect,” see Martinez and Santiso (2003). 
22. As part of preliminary research on financial market sensitivity to political and economic uncertainty in Latin America,
Quispe-Agnoli (2003) ran regressions where the country-risk premium was the dependent variable and the exchange rate
and corporate bond spread were independent variables. 
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coup leader and an admirer of Hugo Chávez,
reached the second round after running a populist
campaign against banana tycoon Alvaro Noboa with
the support of the left and indigenous groups. With
bond spreads already hovering at around 2,000
basis points, it appears that financial markets had
already discounted the risks posed by fiscal and for-
eign debt constraints.
Prior to the 2002 election in Brazil, the real
weakened, the stock market plummeted, and bond
spreads soared to over 2,000 basis points amid fears
of an imminent Lula victory. In August, spreads nar-
rowed by 500 basis points as investors were
cheered by the presidential candidates’ pledges to
honor the $30 billion loan package from the IMF.
However, as Lula gained strength in the polls in
September, bond spreads again surpassed the 2,000
basis point level. After the elections, market senti-
ment improved as investors gained confidence in
Lula’s commitment to respect fiscal constraints, and
by October 2003 bond spreads had fallen to the 750
basis point level.21
This brief preliminary survey of country risk sug-
gests that Brazil is the exception, rather than the
rule, in that international financial markets strongly
reacted to unorthodox economic policy announce-
ments. But is Brazil really an exception? If we com-
pare the performance of Brazilian sovereign bonds
with U.S. corporate high-yield bonds, we see a sim-
ilar movement of bond spreads, suggesting that,
more than a “Lula effect,” there has been a recent
“Enron effect” (Calvo and Talvi 2002). Since high-
yield U.S. corporate bonds and sovereign bonds are
perceived as high-risk investments with some
degree of substitutability, their performance shows
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research is clearly needed to know whether inter-
national investors have become more or less lenient
with unorthodox economic policies and what effect
this change may have on the future of reforms.
Conclusion
I
f the sustainability of reform hinges upon the
beliefs and attitudes of public opinion and the main
players, there are serious reasons for concern in
Latin America because symptoms of reform fatigue
are plentiful. Public support for promarket policies
has been waning since 1998, and currently only a
minority of those surveyed declare themselves in
favor of privatization or free markets. As policymak-
ers have also become less enthusiastic, the reform
process is now stalling in many countries, and two
countries have experienced major setbacks. Unlike
the public at large, opinion leaders are supportive
of privatization, but many qualify their support, and
they are clearly divided about the impact of the so-
called neoliberal model on poverty. Even internation-
al organizations and top economic thinkers are no
longer unified around the need and convenience of
pursuing a core set of promarket reforms to improve
the chances of economic and social development.
This paper has explored a variety of hypotheses
that may help explain the increasing rejection of
became much stronger following the eruption of the
Enron scandal (see Figure 12), which put into ques-
tion the reliability of balance sheets of major corpo-
rations. This atmosphere reduced the appetite for
foreign direct investments in emerging markets,
where the lack of accounting transparency may be an
even more serious issue than in the United States.
Whatever the explanation for the recent strong
comovement, on close inspection the Lula effect
might be less than initially supposed. This prelimi-
nary survey on country risk suggests that interna-
tional investors have become very lenient with the
threats of reform backlashes, which may increase
their likelihood. However, this evidence is still very
inconclusive. The casual evidence just reviewed
may be consistent with other hypotheses. For
instance, investors may have learned to distinguish
between political noise and real threats to the sus-
tainability of structural reform. In fact, Lucio
Gutiérrez and Lula da Silva have proved to be much
more orthodox than expected, while it is debatable
whether Kirchner has substantially altered the
course of structural policy decisions. Furthermore,
in all three cases debt spreads were already at
excessively high levels, indicating that international
investors were all too aware of the flaws of the eco-
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reform. Economic hypotheses gain the upper hand.
Although positive, the effect of reforms on produc-
tivity and growth seems to have been moderate,
largely transitory, and certainly below the expecta-
tions originally created by the reformers. Granted,
reforms in most countries have been incomplete
and have lacked institutional and regulatory sup-
port, but the political and practical demands these
reforms would imply put them beyond the reach of
those countries in most need of them. However,
what seems to have influenced public opinion the
most is the short-run macroeconomic situation of
the countries rather than complex analyses about
what makes reforms more or less successful. The
recent deterioration of some social indicators and
the perception of increased inequality may have
reinforced those negative views in spite of the fact
that the association between those outcomes and
the reforms is extremely weak.
Political explanations cannot account for the
increased rejection of reform. There is no evidence
of an ideological turn toward the left or of a greater
ability on the part of reform opponents to spread
their views in the political arena. However, politics
is bound to play the decisive role in the future of
reform because the parties that have pursued them
have paid a hefty electoral cost. This cost has been
mitigated only when the reforms have been pack-
aged with ambitious anti-inflationary policies, but
other circumstances do not seem to have affected
the reaction of the electorate.
Since a large part of the increased rejection of
reform is associated with the recent growth slow-
down in many countries in the region, an eventual
recovery could be expected to facilitate the reinitia-
tion of the process. This outcome is far from guaran-
teed, however, for at least two reasons. One is the
fragmentation of the political system and the disar-
ray of the political parties in many countries, partly a
consequence of the reform process. The other is the
nature of public opinion. If, as cognitive psychology
maintains, people form their opinions to support
their previous beliefs and serve their own interests,
economic recovery will not necessarily restore confi-
dence in reforms. Though this possibility does not
bode well for the likelihood of further ambitious pro-
market reforms, it must not lead to the conclusion
that reform reversals, such as those in Argentina and
Venezuela, should be expected in other countries. A
more likely scenario is that, especially where pro-
market reforms are well advanced, the eventual
recovery of economic growth will lead to further
institutional and social policy reforms that buttress
the original reforms. Of course, this good scenario
would probably not materialize if the incipient recov-
ery aborts, particularly in the case of Brazil.
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